I. INTRODUCTION
Rights review in the United States is based on two distinct lines of authority: tier review and reasonableness balancing review. Under tier review-typically used under the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, or First Amendment freedom of speech-the Court focuses on whether to adopt strict scrutiny, intermediate review, or minimum rationality review. 1 The chosen standard of review is then applied to the facts. Under reasonableness balancing review-used, among other areas, for analysis of: the dormant Commerce Clause; the Contracts Clause; the Takings Clause; constitutionality of punitive damages in tort actions; less than substantial burdens on unenumerated fundamental rights, such as under the right to vote or right of access to courts; rights of government workers to speak on matters of public concern; congressional regulation under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment; reasonableness of search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment; cruel and unusual punishment consideration under the Eighth Amendment; and procedural due process-the Court balances the benefits of the government regulation against the burden on the individual, and then asks whether given the benefit the burden is In contrast, rights review in other constitutional courts around the world makes use of only one basic approach: proportionality.
3 Proportionality analysis has three basic steps: (1) suitability, which examines whether the government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest; (2) necessity, which asks whether the government has used the least restrictive means to advance its goals, in order to ensure that the government does not burden the right more than is necessary for the government to achieve its goals; and (3) balancing "stricto sensu," which asks whether the marginal benefit of the government regulation to advance the legitimate public interest is greater than the marginal burden on the individual. 4 A preliminary "fourth step"-entitled "legitimacy"-is used by some courts.
5 Under this step, the "judge confirms that the government is constitutionally-authorized to take such a measure" before continuing to apply the suitability, necessity, and balancing steps of the analysis. 6 From an analytic perspective, this inquiry into "legitimacy" is best understood as part of the "suitability" inquiry into whether the government is rationally advancing a "legitimate" government interest, rather than being viewed as an independent inquiry on its own. 7 Despite surface differences between American tier and reasonableness review versus international proportionality review, each approach uses the same building blocks in developing the relevant standard of review. 8 Each is based on a means/end analysis, focusing both on the ends the government is seeking to advance, and the means by which those ends are advanced. 9 Each focuses on the extent to which the government action is narrowly tailored to not burden individual rights more than is viewed as appropriate. 10 Each is concerned with whether the government's interests are strong enough to justify the burden on individual rights. 7. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. It should be noted that nothing of importance turns on this question of whether proportionality review is phrased as a "three-step" or "four-step" analysis. See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 3, at 75. As long as both a "legitimacy" and "suitability" analysis are done, it does not matter whether they are conceived as two separate steps, or as part of one rational basis "means/end" analysis, as discussed herein. See id. By focusing on these three analytic points of commonalty, one can better understand the current doctrinal choices made by United States and international courts, and can better see that both are variations on a similar theme. It is also possible that, over time, the two approaches will move in the direction of more relative convergence, even if complete identity of an approach is not likely to be adopted, given basic differences in judicial temperament in common law and civil law countries. 12 
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS REVIEW
As noted in the Introduction, there are three building blocks to individual rights review in both the United States and international courts. 13 The first building block is adoption of a means/end analysis, focusing both on the ends the government is seeking to advance, and the means by which those ends are advanced.
14 The second building block focuses on the extent to which the government action is narrowly tailored to not burden individual rights more than is viewed as appropriate. 15 The third building block is concerned with whether the government's interests are strong enough to justify the burden on individual rights. 16 
A. Means/End Reasoning
Under the first building block, one has to decide how strong the government end has to be to justify the regulation and how well the means have to be drafted to advance that end. 17 Under the American constitutional doctrines of strict scrutiny, intermediate review, and minimum rationality review, there are three different answers to these questions. 18 Under minimum rationality review, the government action-whether legislation, administrative regulation, or executive orders of the President-only has to be rationally related to advancing a legitimate government end. 19 Great deference is paid to government officials' judgments that such a legitimate 12 government end and a rational relationship exist. 20 Under this deference, the court does not undertake an independent review of the ends and means, but rather only asks whether the government had a "rational basis" for thinking that the government action was rationally related to a legitimate end. 21 Indeed, under minimum rationality review, the Court presumes the statute is constitutional, and the challenger has the burden to prove the lack of a legitimate interest, or that the statute is not rationally related to advancing its end. 22 In contrast, under intermediate review, the government has the burden to justify its action, and the government action must be substantially related to advancing an important or substantial government interest. 23 At strict scrutiny, the government also has the burden to justify its actions, and those actions must be directly related to advancing a compelling or overriding governmental interest. 24 Naturally, under any of these standards of review the governmental interest cannot be illegitimate. 25 An illegitimate government interest will not support the statute under any standard of review. 26 For example, in a sequence of cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that prejudice against interracial marriage, prejudice against the mentally impaired, and animus against politically unpopular groups-such as hippies in communes or homosexuals-are illegitimate governmental interests. 27 The international inquiry into suitability-the first stage of proportionality review-tracks a rational review approach to this first building block by asking whether "the means chosen and the ends pursued 20 . See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 695 ("The Supreme Court generally has been extremely deferential to the government when applying the rational basis test . . . . [I]t is very rare for the Supreme Court to find that a law fails the rational basis test.").
21. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ("Instead, a classification 'must be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.'" (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993))).
22. Id. ("A statute is presumed constitutional, . . . and 'the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.'" (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) )).
23. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 687 ("Under intermediate scrutiny a law is upheld if it is substantially related to an important government purpose . . . . The means used need not be necessary, but must have a 'substantial relationship' to the end being sought.").
24. See id. ("Under strict scrutiny, a law is upheld if it is proved necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. The government . . . must show that it cannot achieve its objective through any less discriminatory alternative.").
25. See id. at 695.
See id.
27. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("animus" against a politically unpopular group, in this case, sexual orientation, is an illegitimate governmental interest); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (prejudice against the mentally impaired is illegitimate); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430, 433 (1984) (prejudice against interracial marriage is illegitimate); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group," in this case "hippie communes," is not a legitimate interest).
is rational and appropriate, given a stated policy purpose." 28 As has been noted, explicit in some courts, and implicit in others, is an inquiry into "legitimacy"-whether the purpose of the government action reflects constitutionally legitimate action. 29 This analysis reflects the same concern American courts have with ensuring that the government is always advancing, at a minimum, legitimate government interests, and is not regulating only for illegitimate reasons.
30
In applying this test, American courts will ask whether the regulation is conceivably advancing a legitimate interest, not whether the actual or plausible purpose of the government regulation is legitimate.
31 Thus, it is only when there is no conceivable legitimate interest to the government regulation that the court will rule the statute unconstitutional under a bare legitimacy analysis. 32 In contrast, under strict scrutiny, the Court will only consider actual governmental purposes to support the statute.
33
Under intermediate review, while the Court's decisions are not as clear, the Court typically uses actual or plausible governmental interests, and usually only considers those interests "put forward" in litigation by the government.
34
The Court has never had to decide if the Court could consider, on its own motion, a plausible purpose for the regulation not argued by the government. 35 The Court has stated, however, that at intermediate review the Court will not consider hypothetical post hoc rationalizations for the act.
36
In contrast to the American doctrine of minimum rationality review, international courts seem to do their own independent review of the government ends and the means by which they are advanced, rather than deferring to the government by only asking whether the government had a rational basis for its action. 37 As typically phrased, the court considers only "stated policy" by the government, similar to American intermediate review, and does not, on its own motion, come up with conceivable justifications for the Act. 38 The government has the burden under each of the three parts of proportionality review: suitability, necessity, and balancing.
39 Nevertheless, despite this higher review than under American minimum rationality review, it has been noted that in practice few laws are struck down under this "suitability" analysis, just as few laws are struck down under minimum rationality review.
40

B. Narrow Tailoring
As with means/end reasoning, there are three different approaches under the American doctrines of strict scrutiny, intermediate review, and minimum rationality review to the second building block issue of whether the government action is narrowly tailored to not burden individual rights more than is viewed as appropriate. 41 Under strict scrutiny, the government action must be the least restrictive effective alternative to advance the government's interest. 42 The international inquiry into "necessity" tracks the strict scrutiny version of the narrow tailoring inquiry. 45 It asks specifically whether the government has used the least restrictive means to advance its goals, in order to ensure that the government does not burden the right more than necessary for the government to achieve its goals. 46 In practice, however, it has been noted that typically "judges do not invalidate a measure simply because they [the judges] can find one less restrictive alternative. Instead, most courts, explicitly or implicitly, insist that policymakers have a duty to consider reasonably available alternatives and to refrain from selecting the most restrictive among them."
47 This is slightly different than American strict scrutiny review, where government actions have been struck down because the judges could imagine a less restrictive effective alternative to the government action. 48 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United States does appear to be concerned with whether the government considered less burdensome alternatives, and, in this way, it mirrors international narrow tailoring analysis. 49 The principle that the government regulation, but the government must insure that "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest . When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals. should consider alternatives, and cannot use post hoc rationalizations to support agency action, is a principle of American administrative law, just as it is a principle of administrative law in international courts.
Id. at 816 (alteration added
50
Depending on how it is applied in practice, a proportionality analysis that focused on a duty to "refrain from selecting the most restrictive" alternative would appear to allow the government to adopt a more restrictive alternative than necessary, as long as it was not the most restrictive among available alternatives. 51 This follows since the analysis would only appear to require the government not to adopt the most restrictive from among available alternatives, but would permit adoption of an alternative that was not necessarily the least restrictive alternative to address the problem.
52
In practice, this might be similar to merely requiring the government not to adopt an alternative substantially more burdensome than other effective alternatives, and thus track the American intermediate review standard of narrow tailoring. 53 It has been noted, however, that a majority of laws that are struck down under proportionality review are struck down because they fail to meet the narrow tailoring/necessity analysis. 54 Thus, perhaps it is closer to American strict scrutiny, where the least restrictive alternative analysis turns out to be fatal to much government regulation tested under strict scrutiny review, but not all government regulation. at all, only on the rationale the agency itself articulated when taking action. The corollary of Chenery is that agencies may not employ 'post hoc rationalizations' offered during litigation to save an action whose original rationale is untenable." (citations omitted)). See also Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 3, at 97-112 (discussing the development of proportionality analysis in German administrative law, and its evolution to constitutional rights review in Germany, and then around the world).
51. Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. As we have explained, "whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."
Id. at 326-27 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30). "But that observation 'says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.'" Id. at 327 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230). "When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied." Id.
Another variation of this narrow tailoring analysis is used by American courts when applying reasonableness balancing. 56 Under this approach, the court considers less restrictive alternatives as part of an overall balancing test to determine whether the government action is reasonable or excessive. 57 59 When making that determination, the Court considers the nature of the local interest and whether it could be promoted as well by laws having a lesser impact on interstate activities.
60
Since the existence of alternatives is not an independent consideration, but part of an overall balancing approach, this can be called a "weak less restrictive alternative test," as opposed to the stronger less restrictive alternative tests of intermediate review and strict scrutiny.
61
C. Balancing Stricto Sensu
Under the international proportionality analysis, "the judge weighs, in light of the facts, the benefits of the act (already found to have been narrowly tailored) against the costs incurred by infringement of the right, in order to decide which side shall prevail." 62 If done with precise rigor, the analysis focuses on whether the marginal benefit of the government regulation to advance the legitimate public interest is greater than the marginal burden on the individual. 63 In practice, many courts are not that rigorous and approach the question more from the perspective of ensuring that "no factor of significance to either side has been overlooked" 64 or, from the perspective of whether given the benefits of the government action versus the costs, "which 'constitutional value' shall prevail, in light of the respective importance of the values in tension, given the facts." Such an approach would appear to track in rigor the American reasonableness balancing approach, where the issue is whether in light of the government's interests and the burden on the individual, including consideration of less burdensome alternatives, the government regulation is "unreasonable," "clearly excessive," "grossly excessive," "grossly disproportionate," or in some other fashion goes "too far." 66 When applying reasonableness balancing, the courts do not defer to "rational basis" legislative judgment, as they do under minimum rationality review in tier analysis. 67 Instead, the courts undertake their own independent review of the strength of the government's ends, and the means by which the government is advancing its ends.
68
In this regard, reasonableness balancing in America is similar to proportionality review, where the courts undertake independent review of the government's action.
69
With regard to the burden of proof on the validity of the law, the similarity of American reasonableness balancing and international proportionality review depends on the precise circumstances in which the reasonableness balancing is done. 70 Under international law, the burden always is on the government to justify its action.
71
Under American reasonableness balancing, the burden is sometimes on the government to justify its action. This is true for 
83
Under tier analysis, the Court does not typically undertake a separate "reasonableness balancing" inquiry. 84 There is, however, an implicit balancing going on. 85 As noted earlier, under the means/end part of strict scrutiny analysis, the government needs to be advancing compelling or overriding interests for the government to prevail. 86 This requirement tends to ensure that the government has very strong reasons for its regulation, and thus would likely prevail in a reasonableness balancing of benefits versus burdens.
87
Even under intermediate review, the government needs important or substantial government interests to prevail. 88 This also tends to assure that if the government only had weak interests, which would be outweighed by the burden on the individual under a reasonableness balancing, then the government would fail the means/end part of intermediate review. strict scrutiny, the Court has indicated that "mere administrative convenience," such as saving governmental costs, cannot be an important or compelling interest. 90 Furthermore, under versions of intermediate review used in First Amendment free speech cases, the Court explicitly considers under the "narrow tailoring" part of the analysis whether the individual is left, after the regulation, with reasonably available alternative means of communication.
91 This works as a check on the government to make sure the government is not burdening the individual too much by the regulation, even if the government is advancing substantial government interests.
92
Such consideration is implicitly a form of ensuring that the marginal burden on the individual in restricting speech, and reducing channels of communication, is not so great as to outweigh the benefits of the statute.
93
For cases of strict scrutiny under First Amendment free speech analysis, the Court is naturally even more concerned that the burden on free speech rights caused by the government action is minimal.
III. ISSUES REGARDING THE EXISTING STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
A. International Proportionality Analysis
As classically stated, there is but one proportionality analysis ("PA") that the Court will use for consideration of every case involving review of government action. As has been noted, "embracing PA is a low-cost move, compared to the costs of developing an untested alternative . . . . PA is a simple but comprehensive doctrinal structure, which facilitates diffusion. Lawyers, law students, and judges can learn the basics quickly and deploy the framework with ease . See, e.g., Clark, 469 U.S. at 295 ("Neither was the regulation faulted, nor could it be, on the ground that without overnight sleeping the plight of the homeless could not be communicated in other ways. The regulation otherwise left the demonstration intact, with its symbolic city, signs, and the presence of those who were willing to take their turns in a day-and-night vigil. Respondents do not suggest that there was, or is, any barrier to delivering to the media, or to the public by other means, the intended message concerning the plight of the homeless.").
94. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 326, 334 (1988) (in a case involving regulation of picketing outside foreign embassies, the Court held that while prohibiting picketing undertaken to "intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass" might be constitutional, prohibiting all negative picketing outside foreign embassies was too broad, and not narrowly tailored Despite this flexibility, which might be used vigorously against the government or deferentially toward the government, depending on the judge, it has been noted, "[w]herever it has been adopted, PA replaced more deferential standards."
98 How stringent, however, may depend on whether the judge uses in any case the more vigorous least restrictive alternative analysis similar to American strict scrutiny, the less vigorous narrowly drawn analysis similar to American intermediate review, 99 the more stringent strictu senso balancing focused on marginal benefits and burdens, or a less stringent generic reasonableness balancing. 100 Unlike American levels of review, where some cases are given more searching scrutiny than others, PA does not explicitly adopt such differing levels of review.
101 It may be, however, that for certain cases judges do adopt a more rigorous analysis, while in other cases they use the less vigorous kind of PA review. 102 Or it may be that in some courts the judges always adopt the more rigorous kind of PA review, while in other courts the judges always adopt the less rigorous kind of PA review.
103
Individuals more knowledgeable about international constitutional decision making would be better positioned to canvass PA decision making around the world and analyze these possible variations in PA review. In this Article, the focus is on the "most appropriate" approach if one single PA standard were to become universal.
104
B. American Standards of Review
Sliding Scale versus Levels of Review
American judges have sometimes considered whether they should scrap the existing levels of review, and adopt "one level" of review-similar to the international proportionality single standard of review-but then apply the test according to a "sliding scale" approach. 105 As typically defined, a sliding scale approach considers such factors as "the constitutional and social importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification [was] drawn."
106 Those who favor a sliding scale believe that it would lead to more candid discussion of the competing interests and therefore provide overall better decision making.
107
On the other hand, the sliding scale approach has been criticized as not providing the judge with sufficient objective standards to minimize judicial activist decision making. 108 Further, a sliding scale approach may well provide lower courts with too much discretion in applying the sliding scale standard.
109 This is particularly true given the growth in the dockets of the lower federal courts, which makes it "essentially impossible for the [Supreme] Court to engage in meaningful 'error correction.'" 110
Tier Analysis
Under tier analysis, the Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly adopted three levels of review. As discussed earlier, under minimum rational review, the legislation has to (1) advance legitimate government ends, (2) be rationally related to advancing these ends, and (3) not impose irrational burdens on individuals.
111 Under intermediate review, the legislation must (1) advance important or substantial government ends, (2) be substantially related to advancing these ends, and (3) not be substantially more burdensome than necessary to advance these ends.
112
Under strict scrutiny, the statute must (1) ends, (2) be directly related to advancing these ends, and (3) be the least restrictive effective means to advance these interests.
113
The first inquiry under each of these three tests is what governmental ends support the statute's constitutionality. 114 Depending on the standard of review, the governmental interests must be: legitimate or permissible; important, substantial, or significant; or compelling or overriding.
115
Of course, the governmental interest to support a statute may be illegitimate, and thus not support the statute under any standard of review.
116 For example, as noted earlier, in a sequence of cases, the Court has stated that prejudice against interracial marriage, prejudice against the mentally impaired, and animus against politically unpopular groups-such as hippies in communes, or homosexuals-are illegitimate governmental interests.
117
The second inquiry under each of these three balancing tests concerns the relationship between the statute's means and how it advances those governmental ends. 118 Depending on the standard of review, the statute must have a rational relationship to its ends, a substantial relationship, or a substantial and direct relationship.
119
This relationship inquiry has two parts: (1) "the extent to which the statute fails to regulate all individuals who are part of some problem (the underinclusiveness inquiry); and (2) the way in which the statute serves to achieve its benefits [ The third inquiry focuses on the burdens imposed by the statute's means. 122 Depending on the standard of review, the statute's burden must be rational, not substantially more burdensome than necessary, or the least restrictive burden that would be effective in advancing the governmental interests. 123 This burden inquiry also has two parts: "(1) the extent to which the statute imposes burdens on individuals who are not [part of the problem that is being] regulated (the overinclusiveness inquiry); and (2) the amount of the burden on individuals who are properly regulated by the statute (the oppressiveness or restrictiveness inquiry)." 124 Again, although under a pristine analysis the Court probably should consider only the overinclusiveness inquiry under Equal Protection Clause analysis, and reserve the restrictiveness inquiry for Due Process Clause analysis, the Court has not disciplined its analysis in this way either.
125
In theory, a statute which is neither underinclusive nor overinclusive, but which only minimally serves the government's interest[s], or greatly burdens individuals, does not deny a citizen equal protection of the laws, because the law is equally applied to all similarly situated parties. It may, however, deny the citizen substantive due process if the burden . . . is sufficiently great compared to the minimal benefit that is achieved. 126 Therefore, under a complete review of the constitutionality of rights under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, both considerations should be considered in every case.
In applying the rational review test, the Court grants substantial deference to legislative judgment regarding the rationality of the legislative classification because, as the Court has often observed, the judiciary does not sit "as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." 127 Thus, it has been noted, "[t]he traditional deference both to legislative purpose [i.e., legislative interests or ends] and to legislative selections among means continues, on the whole, to make the rationality requirement largely equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality."
128 For this reason, this standard of review is often called minimum rational review, because the government action only need be minimally rational to be upheld. 129 Under the Court's Equal Protection Clause doctrine, this "rational relationship" inquiry has two parts. 130 The first aspect focuses on the statute's "underinclusiveness"-that is, to what extent does the statute fail to regulate all individuals who are part of some problem. 131 A statute may be held to be "irrationally underinclusive" if that statute fails to regulate certain individuals who are an equal part, or perhaps even a greater part, of creating some problem as are those individuals whom the statute does regulate, unless there is some rational explanation for why the persons who are equally or a greater part of some problem are not being equally regulated.
132 Such an explanation might be that the administrative costs of that regulation would be too expensive, but the government can get some benefit at low cost from regulating a lesser part of the problem first. 133 A statute that regulates the greater part of the problem first will be held to be "rational" because, as the Court has consistently noted, equal protection does not require that all evils of the same genus be eliminated or none at all. 134 The legislature can adopt a step-by-step approach, as long as each step is rational in terms of which part of the problem is regulated first.
135
A classic example of the Court's "underinclusiveness" analysis occurred in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York. 136 In this case, involving a ban on advertising on vehicles, the Court upheld an exemption for vehicles engaged in the usual business of the owner and not used mainly for advertising. 137 The legislature's legitimate interest in the case was a concern that advertisements on the sides of trucks would be a distraction to other drivers and pedestrians, and that distraction would cause a traffic safety problem.
138 Such distraction would be caused both by ads for other businesses on the side of a truck, which was prohibited under the statute, and by ads for the truck owner's own business, which was permitted.
139
Despite this underinclusiveness in the statute, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court that the underinclusiveness was rational because the local authorities "may well have concluded that those who advertised their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use." 140 Thus, the legislature was attacking the greater part of the problem first. 141 Presumably, in reaching this conclusion, Justice Douglas had in mind that the legislature might have concluded that the nature of the ads for other businesses were more likely to be eye-catching, since the company was paying for the advertising space, and thus their nature was more likely to be distracting. 142 In addition, the legislature may well have concluded that the extent of such advertising was likely to be greater than the number of owners placing ads for their own business on the side of their trucks. 143 It is important to note the way in which the Court's deference to the legislature influenced the outcome of this case. The Court did not say in Railway Express that the Court was convinced that the nature and extent of the advertising on the side of trucks was different between ads for hire and ads for one's own business. 144 Nor did the government have the burden of introducing evidence into the case record. 145 The statute was held to be constitutional once the Court decided that the legislature "may well have concluded" the nature and extent of the advertising was different, and that such a conclusion was not shown by the challenger to be "irrational." 146 The second part of the "rationally furthers" or "rational relationship" inquiry focuses on the statute's "overinclusiveness"-that is, the extent to which the statute imposes burdens on individuals who are not the focus of the statute's regulation. 147 Ideally, of course, a statute should only regulate those persons who are part of creating some problem, and not regulate innocent persons. On the other hand, a statute that burdens innocent persons for no rational reason will be held to be irrationally overinclusive. 150 As the Court has noted, the "question is whether Congress achieved its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way."
151
The case of New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer 152 provides a good example of the Court's overinclusiveness analysis. 153 Beazer involved a New York City Transit Authority policy not to employ persons who use methadone.
154
At the time, methadone was used in New York as a treatment program to help individuals cure their addiction to heroin.
155
Because of traffic safety concerns, the Transit Authority did not want persons on heroin working for the Transit Authority, and there was evidence that some individuals in the methadone treatment program, perhaps as many as twenty to thirty percent, would relapse and start taking heroin again.
156
Although the complete ban on employment was overinclusive, in that perhaps seventy percent of the methadone users would have no ongoing drug problem with heroin, the Court held that the ban was not "irrationally" overinclusive.
157 Absent proof that the "offending [thirty percent] could be excluded as cheaply and effectively in the absence of the rule," 158 the Court held that "the degree of rationality" was sufficient to make the ban constitutional. 159 The Court acknowledged that the Transit Authority's rule was likely "broader than necessary to exclude those methadone users who are not actually qualified to work" and that it may be "unwise for a large employer like [the Transit Authority] to rely on a general rule instead of individualized consideration of every job applicant," but that "represents a policy choice . . . made by that branch of Government vested with the power to make such choices." 160 In its phrasing of intermediate review, the Court has used the term "narrowly tailored" to reflect both the substantial relationship and not substantially more burdensome than necessary elements of intermediate scrutiny. 161 In its phrasing of strict scrutiny, the Court has used the terms "precisely tailored" or "necessary" to reflect the fact that at strict scrutiny the statute must directly advance its ends and be the least restrictive effective means of doing so. 162 Unfortunately, sometimes the Supreme Court of the United States has used the phrase "narrowly tailored" under strict scrutiny. 163 To reflect the rigor of strict scrutiny analysis, and to separate this approach from the more flexible "substantially" narrowlytailored analysis of intermediate review, the terms "precisely tailored" or "necessary" are better terms to use than "narrowly tailored" for the strict scrutiny "least restrictive alternative" test.
While these three standards of review are clearly identified in modern Supreme Court doctrine, two other standards of review have been used in modern doctrine. 164 These standards reflect variations on the three inquiries of governmental interests, relationship to benefits, and burdens. 165 As noted, under intermediate review, the legislation must: (1) advance important or substantial government interests; (2) be substantially related to advancing those interests; and (3) not be substantially more burdensome than necessary to advance these interests. 166 Strict scrutiny requires an increased level of scrutiny for each of these three questions. 167 Under strict scrutiny, the statute must: (1) advance compelling governmental interests; (2) be directly related, as well as substantially related, to advancing those interests; and (3) be the least restrictive effective means of doing so. This is the test used to determine the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations. 170 191 and traditional strict scrutiny (all three elements strict).
192
These levels of scrutiny provide a stepladder approach toward standards of review, with each higher level of scrutiny clearly more rigorous than the preceding level. Each of these levels of scrutiny is also clearly defined in terms of doctrinal inquiries that have been discussed in prior cases. 193 These levels thus provide predictability, along with flexibility, which are useful goals in developing an approach toward standards of review. Furthermore, because each level is composed of elements, which are used in many cases, there are plenty of precedents available on how to apply the standard, even if few cases have used that precise standard. 194 For example, although few cases have applied loose strict scrutiny, there are plenty of strict scrutiny cases on "compelling" governmental interests and "directly related" advancement of benefits, and plenty of intermediate review cases applying the "not substantially more burdensome than necessary" test. 
Reasonableness Balancing
Under the Supreme Court of the United States reasonableness balancing analysis, the Court looks at governmental ends, benefits, and burdens, which are then considered together and weighed one against the other.
196
Although the Supreme Court of the United States uses this approach in many doctrinal areas, each with its own precise test, the Court has never acknowledged that they all represent the same kind of analysis. However, in each case the Court considers the government's ends, how the government's action beneficially advances the ends, and how the government's action burdens individuals who are being regulated.
197
Professor Alexander Aleinikoff has noted that the procedural due process cases and the dormant Commerce Clause cases are classic examples of balancing tests. 198 Under the procedural due process test of Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court considers: (1) "the [g]overnment's interest" or ends in the case; (2) the means by which existing procedures achieve the government's ends, including "the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . through [present] procedures . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedur[es] . . . ."; and (3) "the private interest" that will be burdened. 199 Under dormant Commerce Clause analysis, as phrased in Pike v. Bruce Church, the Court considers: (1) the state's "legitimate local public interest"; (2) the means by which the statute achieves these ends, including whether the benefits of the statute could be promoted "as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities"; and (3) given this, whether the "burden" on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive" given the statute's benefits.
200
In applying this kind of balancing test, there is an issue of whether the challenger has the burden of establishing that the governmental action is unconstitutional, or whether the government has the burden of establishing that the action is constitutional. Sometimes, as in each of the two cases cited above, the burden is on the challenger to establish the unconstitutionality of the governmental action. 201 Cases under the Contracts Clause that involve the government substantially impairing the contract obligations of their own contracts have a similar structure. 202 For example, in United States Trust Co. of New York, the challenger has the burden of showing-given the three-part factor balancing of the state's "legitimate" interest; the statute's means, including whether the benefits of the statute could be served "equally well" by an "evident and more moderate course"; and the "burden" on individual contract rights-that the burden was not "reasonable and necessary" given the statute's benefits. 203 The burden is also on the challenger under standard Takings Clause review of regulations. 204 The challenger thus has to show the regulation goes "too far" in the language of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 205 or was "unreasonable" in the modern phrasing in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 206 Under Penn Central, the Court balances the burden on the individual in terms of the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and whether it leaves the individual with a reasonable rate of return on the investment against the benefits of the government action. 207 The challenger also must show that a punitive damage award is "grossly excessive" under the reasonableness balancing test in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 208 However, sometimes the burden shifts to the government. For whether the benefits could be achieved as well by available nondiscriminatory alternatives; and (3) the burden on interstate commerce, but the burden shifts to the government to establish the constitutionality of its regulation.
209
In First Amendment jurisprudence, when considering the right of government workers to speak on matters of public concern, the government has the burden to establish in cases like Pickering v.
Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois that:
(1) the government's legitimate ends in "promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees" (2) prevails in a "balance" against "the interests of the teacher" in free speech, (3) including whether the government could act with more "narrowly drawn grievance procedures." 210 The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause test in Dolan v. City of Tigard requires the government to establish a "rough proportionality" between the government's burden on the individual and the individual's burden on society. 211 As the Court noted in Dolan, this test is similar to the kind of balancing done in search and seizure cases under the Fourth Amendment, where the government has the burden to show that any search and seizure is "reasonable" under the circumstances. 212 The Supreme Court of the United States also will apply reasonableness balancing to less-than-substantial burdens on unenumerated fundamental rights. For [T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. Accordingly, the mere fact that a State's system "creates barriers . . . tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose . . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny."
. . . A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights." 219 For example, in Ball v. James, 220 voting rights for an Arizona water reclamation district were weighted depending on how many acres of land each voter had.
221
This weighting would normally have violated the principle of "one person, one vote" recognized in Reynolds v. Sims 222 and many other cases. 223 Under that doctrine, only variations from equal voting that can satisfy a strict scrutiny, least restrictive alternative analysis are permissible. 224 However, since the district in Ball had relatively limited authority, because its primary purpose was to provide water management for the Salt River District, the Court refused to apply Reynolds, and instead applied only reasonableness analysis, upholding the law because "Arizona could rationally make the weight of their vote dependent upon the number 217. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992 of acres they own, since that number reasonably reflects the relative risks they incurred as landowners and the distribution of the benefits and burdens of the District's water operations." 225 The Court has applied the same kind of analysis in cases involving the right of access to the ballot. 226 For example, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 227 the Court dealt with Minnesota's ban on fusion tickets appearing together on the ballot. 228 The majority opinion and the two dissenting opinions agreed that for "severe" burdens strict scrutiny would be appropriate. 229 For less severe burdens, the majority applied the Ball and Burdick kind of reasonableness analysis. 230 A dissent would have applied intermediate review.
231
The Court does something similar in terms of the right of access to courts. For severe burdens on access to courts, such as cases involving burdens on fundamental rights-for example, an attempt to terminate a parent's parental rights-the Court applies strict scrutiny. 232 For less than severe burdens, such as filing fee in a voluntary bankruptcy case, the Court applies a reasonableness balancing approach. 233 Similarly, the Court applies strict scrutiny to severe burdens on the right to travel, such as limiting new residents' access to welfare or health care for the indigent under the Medicaid program. 234 However, for less than severe burdens, such as requiring a new resident to wait one year before bringing a divorce action in the state, where the person could bring the divorce action in the state where they were married, the Court applies a reasonableness balancing approach.
235
The Court has also applied such a reasonableness analysis when dealing with limitations on the rights of prisoners to vote, as in O'Brien v. Skinner.
236
Because prisoners give up many rights that persons not incarcerated take for granted, burdens on prisoners' right to vote are not 225. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. at 370-71. 226. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369-70 (1997 Under the Eighth Amendment, the challenger can prevent the state from imposing cruel and unusual punishment, which involves an analysis of whether the punishment is "grossly disproportionate" to the crime. 240 A similar proportionality analysis applies with respect to the prohibition of excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.
241
"Undue burden" analysis in right of access to abortion cases can be viewed similarly. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not explicitly adopted this approach, the best understanding of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 242 is that it held that undue burdens, defined as "substantial obstacles" to obtaining an abortion, trigger strict scrutiny, the standard of review applied in Roe v. Wade, 243 while less than undue burdens trigger only a reasonableness balancing approach.
244
In applying any of these reasonableness balancing tests, the Court does not substantially defer to the legislature's rational basis judgment, but rather exercises independent review. A] court, not a legislature, must make the ultimate constitutional conclusion, exercising its 'independent judicial judgment' in light of the whole record to determine whether a law exceeds constitutional boundaries." (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006))). 246. See, e.g., id. at 690 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) ("In applying this kind of standard the Court normally defers to a legislature's empirical judgment in matters where a legislature is likely to have greater expertise and greater institutional factfinding capacity." (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180 (1997))); Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413-14 (noting that while the "reasonableness" standard for determining marriage rights of prisoners "'is not toothless,'" "[i]n the volatile prison environment, it is essential that prison officials be given broad discretion to prevent . . .
Seven Ultimate Levels of Review
Taken together, this discussion has suggested there are seven different balancing tests used by the Supreme Court of the United States in various cases. 247 These seven tests can be organized in terms of the level of rigor required for the governmental action to be constitutional. 248 At one extreme is the minimum rational review balancing test. 249 Under this test, the governmental action is constitutional unless the challenger can establish that the action is not supported by any legitimate governmental end, or is not rationally related to advancing a legitimate governmental end, or imposes an irrational burden on individuals. 250 In applying this test, the Court gives "substantial deference" to the government's judgment concerning the legitimacy of the ends and the rationality of the means.
251
The Court permits "any conceivable" legitimate end to be used to make the action constitutional.
252 Slightly more rigorous than this test are the two factorbalancing constitutional tests. These tests are more burdensome on the government than minimum rational review, because even if the governmental action is rationally related to advancing a legitimate governmental end and does not impose an irrational burden on individuals, if the burden is too great and the benefit is too small, the governmental action will still fail the factor balancing test because the burden will be: "clearly excessive," as under dormant Commerce Clause review; or not "reasonable and necessary," as under Contracts Clause review; or not "roughly proportionate," as under Takings Clause review; or some other phrasing of not "reasonable," as under Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine. 247. See supra notes 19-22, 127-128 and accompanying text. The discussion in this section of the seven kinds of balancing tests (minimum rational review, plus six levels of higher scrutiny), is generally based upon R. Randall Kelso 253. For these various phrasings, see supra notes 200-203, 211-212 and accompanying text. Justice Breyer discussed these kinds of heightened rational review interest-balancing tests in his dissent in Heller, where he noted, "[c]ontrary to the majority's unsupported suggestion that this sort of 'proportionality' approach is unprecedented, . . . the Court has applied it in various constitutional contexts, including election-law cases, speech cases, and due process cases." Heller, 554 U.S. at 690 (Breyer, J., The Court does not give the same kind of "substantial deference" to the government's judgment regarding either the ends advanced or the means employed when applying these factor-balancing tests. 254 Nevertheless, despite the Court determining for itself whether the underlying policies are actually supported by fact, some deference to governmental judgment is still given. 255 259 "reasonableness" standard for determining marriage rights of prisoners "'is not toothless,'" "[i]n the volatile prison environment, it is essential that prison officials be given broad discretion to prevent . . . disorder."
260 However, these tests are less burdensome on the government than intermediate review or strict scrutiny, since both of the factorbalancing tests permit the governmental action to be justified using legitimate government interests, rather than the important or substantial governmental interests of intermediate review, or the compelling governmental interests of strict scrutiny.
261
Because the two factor-balancing tests permit resorting to legitimate governmental interests, they are best understood as versions of rational review.
262
To give these tests names that reflect that aspect of their approach, the first factor-balancing test, where the burden is still on the challenger to prove the unconstitutionality of the governmental action, similar to the burden under minimum rational review, can be called "second-order" rational review. 263 It is "second-order" because it is the least rigorous of the balancing tests that are more rigorous than minimum rational review. 264 The second factor-balancing test, where the burden shifts joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (election regulation); Mathews , 424 U.S. at 347-49 (procedural due process); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (government employee speech) to the government to justify constitutionality, can be called "third-order" rational review, since all the linguistic variations of this balancing test place the burden on the government, and thus are the most rigorous kind of rational review.
265
The four kinds of heightened scrutiny tests of intermediate review, intermediate review with bite, loose strict scrutiny, and strict scrutiny all involve cases where the government has the burden of proving the constitutionality of its action. 266 They all require more than mere legitimate interests to support the governmental action. 267 Thus, they are all more rigorous than any of the three versions of rational review: minimum rational review, second-order rational review, and third-order rational review. 268 In sum, there are thus seven different balancing tests that the Court applies in various cases. 
A. Civil Law versus Common Law Styles of Reasoning and the Levels of Review
Judicial reasoning in constitutional, statutory, or common-law cases can adopt either an inductive or a deductive mode of reasoning. The difference between deductive and inductive modes of analysis was discussed in 1975 by Columbia Law School Professor Harry Jones. 271 In his article, Our Uncommon Common Law, he stated:
The story of law in the Western World is a tale of two cities, Rome, where the continental European legal tradition had its rise, and London, to which our own legal system traces its pedigree. The nations of Europe and the Americas, and such Asian and African nations as have followed European legal patterns, are divided into two great law families: the civil-law countries and the common-law countries. A civil-law country is one whose legal system reflects, however remotely, the structural concepts, principles, and decisional methods of classical Roman law, the law of the Roman Empire as compiled and promulgated at Constantinople in the sixth century as the Corpus Juris Civilis of the Emperor Justinian.
. . . .
[T]he story of the common law has to begin in London . . . with the royal courts at Westminster.
272
Professor Jones noted about the civil-law system: A lawyer, judge or legal scholar schooled in the civil-law tradition approaches legal problems and legal sources with certain philosophical presuppositions quite different from those of the common-law lawyer. . . . [I]n the civil-law universe of discourse, nothing is law, in the full sense, that has not been written down in exclusive textual form and enacted by the state's sovereign power. In civil-law countries, the codes in which private law is cast are formulated in broad general terms and are thought of as completely comprehensive, that is, as the all-inclusive source of authority to which every disputed case must be referred for decision. The civillaw lawyer or judge, faced with a particular problem or controversy, must locate his answer somewhere within the four corners of the authoritative code. Learned commentary on the code may help him discover the code's true meaning for the case at hand, but his decision must ultimately be justified, at least in form, by deduction from some principle in the code itself-and most certainly not by reliance on the authority of past judicial decisions.
273
Professor Jones contrasted this with the mode of reasoning of the commonlaw system:
The common-law lawyer works in quite another metier and brings different jurisprudential presuppositions to his tasks. Although a great deal of contemporary American and English law is legislative in origin, the law inferred from judicial precedents is fully as important with us as the law set down by statutory enactments. . . .
[O]ur codes are not the all-inclusive, systematic statements found in civil-law countries. In any event, our modes of thought are less deductive, far less confident that the final answer to every contemporary problem can be found within the confines of any enactment, however comprehensive. An eminent Italian jurist, impatient with my incorrigibly common-law habits of reasoning, once put the difference to me in these terms: "Give the same problem to a civil lawyer and a common lawyer. What do we do? We find the governing principle in the text of the code. What do you do? You look for a case. We reason from principle. You stumble along by analogy. I wonder how you ever get anything decided at all." My friend's charge is overstated, but he is quite right in a way. We common-law lawyers . . . do exhibit a Pavlovian stimulus and response effect: give us a problem, we try to think of a case, a judicial precedent, and if we cannot think of one, we go off to the library and start looking for it. We are uneasy with doctrinal generalizations, more comfortable with the facts of cases than with general concepts, and we never feel quite secure about our professional predictions until we have located a "case in point," that 273. Id. at 448-49 (emphasis in original).
is, a past court adjudication in a controversy that was factually alike, or something like, the problem now presented to us.
274
Professor Jones cautioned in his article that we should be wary about exaggerating these differences. 275 Professor Steve Nickles similarly noted in an article about the civil law: "[A civilian lawyer] looks at the articles of a Code not as mere rulings, but as particular expressions of more general ideas. Therefore, if no express answer to a certain problem is found in the Code, it is not improper to consider various articles in order to induce from them a more general rule and to apply this rule if it can give a solution. It has sometimes been said that articles of a code are not only law, but sources of law. This is true, not only in the sense that the courts may, by deduction, decide on the implications of a certain article, but also in the sense that the courts may, if necessary, use induction to discover the general rules implied in the provisions of a code and then, reverting to deduction, develop the full potential of these rules in the solution of the problem at hand."
276
On the other hand, differences do remain. The common law's inductive process embraces:
[a] frame of mind which habitually looks at things in the concrete, not in the abstract: . . . which prefers to go forward cautiously on the basis of experience from this case to the next case, as justice in each case seems to require, instead of seeking to refer everything back to supposed universals; . . . [it is] the frame of mind behind the sure-footed Anglo-Saxon habit of dealing with things as they arise instead of anticipating them by abstract universal formulas. This difference is reflected in the development of rights jurisprudence in American and in international courts. 278 It is no surprise that international courts would be more predisposed to adopt a three-step deductive model of review-proportionality review, with its suitability, necessity, and balancing components-and apply that model to all cases in deductive fashion. 279 Historically, the doctrine developed in Germany after 1945, 280 and then spread to other countries based on the status of the German court and post-1945 constitutions which adopt similar basic principles of "human dignity" and a listing of "individual rights" as done in the German constitution. 281 It reflects the job given to constitutional courts under these new constitutions to serve as an independent judicial bulwark in favor of individual rights against the state.
282
In contrast, in the United States, the various "tiers" and versions of "reasonableness" analysis were developed in a case-by-case fashion, with the Court starting with an initial "reasonableness" analysis in the late nineteenth century in dormant commerce clause cases, which then morphed at the end of the nineteenth century through a less restrictive means analysis into something more akin to strict scrutiny. 283 The Court then developed new standards to deal with new problems as they arose. 284 The first change occurred with the rejection, in 1937, of less restrictive means analysis in economic rights cases, whether under the dormant Commerce Clause or Lochner v. New York 285 liberty of contract due process analysis, and its replacement in 1938 by the minimum rationality review of United States v. Carolene Products Co. 286 In Carolene Products, the Court began the process of developing higher tiers of scrutiny for fundamental rights cases, or cases involving suspect classes, like racial or ethnic minority groups. 287 The Court also was simultaneously developing stricter forms of scrutiny for freedom of speech cases under the First Amendment.
288
As new cases presented themselves, however, these two levels of scrutiny-minimum rationality review and strict scrutiny-proved to be inadequate to resolve concrete fact patterns. 294 Again, focusing on specific fact situations, and without any clear acknowledgment, the Court adopted a slightly more rigorous form of review than intermediate review for commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas. 295 And the Court has adopted a slightly less rigorous form of strict scrutiny review for testing racial discrimination in redistricting decisions in Bush v. Vera.
296
The determination of what level of review to apply seems to be based on a number of factors that relate to whether the Court feels comfortable trusting the government's action, in which case minimum rationality review is likely to be applied, or how much the Court is suspicious about the government's action. One factor that the Supreme Court of the United States has used to make this determination involves: (1) whether arguments of text, context, and history suggest that the classification is one the Framers and ratifiers would have thought deserves heightened scrutiny. 297 As the Court has noted, "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." was ratified in 1868, 299 the Court noted as long ago as 1886 that its provisions "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." 300 Thus, cases involving race, ethnicity, or national origin traditionally trigger the highest kind of Equal Protection Clause reviewstrict scrutiny in today's terminology. 301 Three additional factors, stated in footnote four in the famous case of Carolene Products, that are used to help determine the proper level of review are: (2) whether a fundamental right is involved, particularly a right that "appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments"; (3) whether a deficiency exists in the "political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation"; or (4) whether the statute is "directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities," or reflects "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" who, because they are discrete and insular, cannot be expected to protect their interests adequately in the legislative process. 305 or (7) whether the classification is viewed by the judge as a product of false stereotypes about individuals, particularly if part of an historical pattern of such discrimination. 306 An additional set of two factors, discussed in City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 307 are: (8) to what extent the judges are competent to make the substantive decisions required at heightened scrutiny which involve second-guessing legislative judgment as to whether the ends are sufficiently important or compelling, the means are sufficiently narrowly tailored or necessary, and whether any alternatives to the legislation would be effective or not; 308 or (9) would a Pandora's Box be opened up where heightened scrutiny in the case would lead to demands for heightened scrutiny in other similarly situated cases, creating unpredictability in the law.
309
With regard to the reasonableness analysis of the late nineteenth century, the Court continued that approach, post-1937, in the dormant Commerce Clause cases, culminating in the Pike v. Bruce Church and Maine v. Taylor tests under the dormant Commerce Clause. 310 In each of these areas, the Court has refrained from applying minimum rationality review, perhaps based on a tenth factor: (10) 312 From the other end, over the last thirty years, the Court has begun reducing the standard of review in some unenumerated fundamental rights cases away from strict scrutiny to reasonableness balancing. 313 Consideration of some of the ten factors of judicial review may have suggested to the Court that only modest infringements on unenumerated fundamental rights deserve a lower level of scrutiny, but still higher than minimum rationality review. 314 308. See id. at 443 ("Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the classification deals with mental retardation.").
309. See id. at 445-46 ("[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups . . . . One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.").
310. 
Benefits of American Standards of Review over Proportionality Review
While PA analysis has a number of benefits, the single standard of proportionality would provide little guidance for American lower courts faced with resolving constitutional disputes in a variety of settings, which may call for greater or less deference to government in various contexts. This is particularly true, as noted earlier, given growth in lower federal courts' dockets, which makes it "essentially impossible for the [Supreme] Court to engage in meaningful 'error correction. '" 326 In addition, for fundamental rights, American strict scrutiny does provide a higher level of review than proportionality review. 327 For persons supportive of court review of individual rights, American review may be more protective than international proportionality review. 328 For example, First Amendment freedom of speech, even in the context of hate speech, is very vigorous in America, more so than hate speech regulation in Europe. 
Considerations Regarding Convergence of the American and International Approaches
Under American constitutional doctrine, for reasonableness balancing analysis, it would be analytically appropriate if the Supreme Court of the United States were to more clearly phrase all the reasonableness balancing tests as the same kind of review, with only the variation, discussed herein, that sometimes the burden is on the challenger to prove unreasonableness and sometimes the burden is on the State to prove reasonableness. 330 That would reduce to two standards of review (second-order and third-order rational review) the twenty-four plus standards of review that are currently stated for: dormant Commerce Clause analysis; the Contracts Clause; the Takings Clause; constitutionality of punitive damages in tort actions; less than substantial burdens on unenumerated fundamental rights, such as under the right to vote or right of access to courts; rights of government workers to speak on matters of public concern; congressional regulation under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment; reasonableness of search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment; cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines consideration under the Eighth Amendment; and procedural due 326 process. 331 A more deductive, analytic approach to the standard applied in these cases would better track the logical, deductive approach of civil law countries.
In addition, there appears to be some movement in America to get rid of the tests denominated in this Article as "intermediate with bite" and "loose strict scrutiny," and to rephrase the commercial speech doctrine, currently Central Hudson Gas, and racial redistricting cases, currently Bush v. Vera, as strict scrutiny cases. 332 That would get the American system down to the three basic tiers of review (minimum rationality review, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny) and two reasonableness tests (burden on challenger in one; burden on the State in the other). 333 On the other hand, there is some benefit in having "intermediate with bite" and "loose strict scrutiny," as they are logically consistent stepping stones in the level of review between intermediate review and strict scrutiny, and one can agree with the current approach that because commercial speech is "heartier" it does not need strict scrutiny protection, 334 and that state governments should be given greater than strict scrutiny flexibility in making their political redistricting decisions. 335 For proportionality analysis, there are four possible alternatives, given the two kinds of narrow tailoring and two kinds of stricto sensu balancing discussed earlier. 336 The four approaches are: (1) loose narrow tailoring and loose balancing; (2) loose narrow tailoring and strict balancing; (3) strict narrow tailoring and loose balancing; (4) strict narrow tailoring and strict balancing. 337 To modify PA to reflect these four approaches would require developing a theory to justify when looser or stricter narrow tailoring and stricto sensu balancing should be used. 338 In addition, many countries with Constitutions written since 1945 have similar kinds of economic and social rights, and thus do not have the same split as in American doctrine between economic and social rights. 339 This suggests even less of a reason for international courts to adopt different versions of PA analysis.
Given the seven levels of review in American doctrine, perhaps the best approach for one consistent PA analysis would be to adopt an approach in the middle of the American standards of review. 340 This would adopt the looser or intermediate review form of narrow tailoring analysis, but the stricter "marginal benefit is greater than marginal burden" approach for stricto sensu balancing. 341 A rigorous strict scrutiny kind of least restrictive alternative test is perhaps too restrictive on needed government discretion in many cases. Is it really true that it makes sense for courts to second-guess government decision making in every case by requiring the government to prove the government used the absolutely least burdensome alternative in every case? 342 In contrast, requiring the government not to adopt an approach substantially more burdensome then necessary, and thus not on the end of being the most burdensome kind of regulation, seems a more appropriate of a standard if one is going to have one uniform standard for every case. 343 On the other hand, once the government has done this, the government should have the burden to show that the benefits of the regulation truly outweigh the burdens. This kind of PA would thus be more rigorous than third-order American rationality review ( One question any judge must ask before deciding how to resolve a legal dispute is whether judicial decision making should be separable from moral or social values, i.e., should judges view law solely as a body of rules and principles from which legal conclusions are derived-the positivist assumption-or should judges view law as a body of rules and principles testable by reference to some external standard of rightness, some moral or social value-law as normative or prescriptive, not descriptive. 345 Concerning this issue of the nature of the judicial task, a judge could aim at producing decisions and opinions that are "good law" in the narrow sense of being clear, certain, predictable, and unquestionably within the legitimate power of the court: a "positivist" approach to judicial decision making. 346 As noted in an article entitled Constitutional Positivism:
If one has a positivist view of legal identification, pursuant to which items of law can be "recognized" without satisfying a moral standard, . . . then one whose job partly involves law application could do that part of the job without having to engage in any moral reasoning whatsoever. . . . As a result, positivist judges, were they so inclined, could in some systems get away with an amoral conception of their task . . . .
347
In contrast, a judge could aim at producing law and applications of law that accord with certain moral principles embedded in the society's legal and moral culture. 348 Judges adopting this more "normative" perspective tend to view the judge's role as requiring the judge to give some weight to the moral insights and traditions that lie behind legal rules and that may develop over time. 349 As Professor Ronald Dworkin has noted, "what an individual is entitled to have, in civil society, depends upon both the practice and the justice of its political institutions." 350 In determining questions of justice, Professor Dworkin noted that from this perspective judges should only make such decisions as they can justify within a theory "that also justifies the other decisions they propose to make." 351 That is, a judge adopting such a "normative" perspective should ensure that each decision is consistent with society's background legal and moral culture and society's "norms."
352 As Professor Dworkin has noted, such an approach "condemns the practice of making decisions that seem right in isolation, but cannot be brought within some comprehensive theory of general principles and policies that is consistent with other decisions also thought right." 353 The material of the judicial task for positivist judges is existing common law, statutes, and constitutional text. 354 With regard to the form or definition of what constitutes law, the positivist view is that judges may only discover, declare, and apply the law as it already exists.
355
The fundamental purpose or end of the judicial task for positivists is whether the law is traceable to an authoritative source. 356 The Nightmare is this. Litigants in law cases consider themselves entitled to have from judges an application of the existing law to their disputes, not to have new law made for them. Of course it is accepted that what the existing law is need not be and very often is not obvious, and the trained expertise of the lawyer may be needed to extract it from the appropriate sources. But for conventional thought, the image of the judge, to use the phrase of an eminent English Judge, Lord Radcliffe, is that of the "objective, impartial, erudite, and experienced declarer of the law," not to be confused with the very different image of the legislator. The Nightmare is that this image of the judge, distinguishing him from the legislator, is an illusion, and the expectations which it excites are doomed to disappointment-on an extreme view, always, and on a moderate view, very frequently. 357 In contrast to the positivist view, the material of the judicial task for judges who adopt the normative view includes background norms that infuse existing common-law, statutory, and constitutional enactments. 358 The normative view is that judges have the power to make law based on these background norms, and regularly do so, covertly as well as overtly. 359 For normativists, changes in law rest in part on the substance of these background considerations, not merely on the logic or purpose of existing concepts.
360
The fundamental purpose or end of the judicial task for normative theorists is whether the law has a defensible substantive content. 361 Professor Hart called this normative view of the judicial task, "The Noble Dream."
362 As Hart described it:
[A] legal system was too narrowly conceived if it was represented as containing only rules attaching closely defined legal consequences to closely defined, detailed factual situations and enabling decisions to be reached and justified by simple subsumption of particular cases under such rules. Besides rules of this kind, legal systems contain large-scale general principles; some of these are explicitly acknowledged or even enacted, whereas others have to be inferred as the most plausible hypotheses explaining the existence of the clearly established rules. Such principles do not serve merely to explain rules in which they are manifested but constitute general guidelines for decision when particular rules appear indeterminate or ambiguous or where no relevant authoritative, explicitly formulated rule seems available . . . . After all, the United States Constitution was adopted against the backdrop of the 1776 Declaration of Independence, which specially stated that individuals are "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of HappinessThat to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed." 377 Similarly, for many post-1945 constitutions around the world, the positive documents set out a number of specific individual rights, as well as general right to "human dignity," which it is understood the courts have the obligation to protect. 378 For these judges, then, both on natural law and positivist grounds, the more vigorous kind of PA or heightened scrutiny is appropriate. Such review should go beyond clear textually specific rights, customs and traditions, and Thayerian/Holmesian deference.
379
VI. CONCLUSION Part I of this Article notes that rights review in the United States is based on two distinct lines of authority: tier review and reasonableness balancing review. Under tier review, courts focus on whether to adopt strict scrutiny, intermediate review, or minimum rationality review. Under reasonableness balancing review, courts balance the benefits of the government regulation against the burden on the individual, and then ask whether given the benefit the burden is "unreasonable," "clearly excessive," "grossly excessive," "grossly disproportionate," or in some other fashion goes "too far." Rights review in constitutional courts around the world use one approach: proportionality. Proportionality analysis has three basic steps: suitability, necessity, and balancing stricto sensu.
Despite these surface differences, each approach uses the same building blocks in developing the relevant standard of review. As discussed in Part II, each is based on a means/end analysis, focusing on the ends the Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor). Pragmatism, or instrumentalism, is related to natural law decision-making, in that it calls for the judge to go beyond positive text and positive customs and traditions in interpreting constitutional text. Such an approach is likely to be slightly more judicially activist than natural law, in that it calls for the judge to engage in some explicit consideration of sound social policy to resolve constitutional issues if text, context, history, legislative and executive practice, and judicial precedents leave the case result still in doubt. On this point, see generally Kelso government is seeking to advance and the means by which those ends are advanced. Each focuses on the extent to which the government action is narrowly tailored to not burden individual rights more than is viewed as appropriate. Each is concerned with whether the government's interests are strong enough to justify the burden on individual rights. Given this backdrop, Part III discusses the international proportionality analysis and American tier and reasonableness review in greater depth. Part IV considers these standards of review against a backdrop of civil law and common law decision-making styles.
Finally, in Part V, the standards of review are related to the philosophic divide between positivist and natural law theories of justice. As discussed in Part V, both the current majority on the Supreme Court of the United States and international constitutional rights decision making reject review based on a limited positivist vision of protecting only clearly identified specific rights in the Constitution, consistency with customs and traditions of society, and limited review to ensure the government action is not irrational. Instead, the current majority of the Supreme Court of the United States and international constitutional decision making reflect a commitment to protecting human dignity against government infringement.
